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Abstract
We introduce the concept of non-cooperative computation (NCC), which is the joint computation
of a function by self-motivated agents, where each of the agents possesses one of the inputs to the
function. In NCC the agents communicate their input (truthfully or not) to a trusted center, which
performs a commonly-known computation and distributes the results to the agents. The question is
whether the agents can be incented to communicate their true input to the center, allowing all agents to
compute the function correctly. NCC is a game theoretic concept and speciﬁcally is couched in terms
ofmechanismdesign.NCC is a very broad framework and is specialized by imposing speciﬁc structure
on the agents’ utility functions. The technical results we present are speciﬁc to the setting in which
each agent has a primary interest in computing the function and a secondary interest in preventing the
others from computing it (properties called correctness and exclusivity). For this setting we provide
a complete characterization of the Boolean functions that are non-cooperatively computable. We do
this for three versions of NCC: a basic deterministic version, a probabilistic version and a version in
which the computation can be subsidized by the center. The analysis turns out to depend on whether
the inputs of the agents are probabilistically correlated or not and we analyze both cases.1
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1. Introduction
In this paper we introduce the framework of non-cooperative computation (NCC). In the
NCC model, n agents each wish to compute an n-ary function w (we assume it is the same
function for all agents, although that can be generalized), with each of the agents holding
one of the inputs tow. For example, they may each hold a number and wish to compute the
average. Or, to draw from the Boolean domain from which most of our technical results are
drawn, they may each hold a bit (0 or 1) and wish to compute the majority function (which
is 1 iff a majority of the input bits are). The process of computation is mediated by a center
as follows: Each agent declares his input (truthfully or not) to the center, the center performs
computation based on those inputs and reports back to the agents an output. In the basic
setting we will deﬁne, the center simply appliesw to the declared inputs and announces the
value to all the agents. In two extensions of the basic setting we will consider the center is
given greater ﬂexibility, but in all cases the center’s protocol is common knowledge among
the agents.
The only thing standing between the agents and successful computation are their con-
ﬂicting self interests. The incentives of the agents in NCC are multi-faceted, but are always
deﬁned in terms of the information available to the various agents. In this paper we will
concentrate on agents whose utility function has two components. The ﬁrst, called correct-
ness, is the wish to compute the function correctly. The second, called exclusivity, is the
wish that other agents do not compute the function correctly. We assume a lexicographic
ordering between these two, with correctness preceding exclusivity.
As an example of this two-tiered preference ordering, imagine several biologists wishing
to sequence a genome of an organism, each having deciphered a different part of the genome.
Each of themwould like to know the entire sequence so that s/he can publish a paper with the
correct genetic code, but, given that, s/he would just as soon be a sole author. Assuming the
scientists communicate via a center as described, the question is whether the scientists can
be incented to reveal the correct code segments and thus all scientists will know the entire
genetic code at the end. If the answer is yes, we will say that the function which assembles
the entire genetic code from the individual segments is non-cooperatively computable,
or NCC.2
To get a more technical intuition for this problem, let us consider again the Boolean
domain. Speciﬁcally, consider agents 1, . . . , n trying to compute some Boolean function
w(x1, . . . , xn) where xi is Boolean and known only by agent i. For example, consider the
parity function (whose value is 1 iff the number of 1’s in the input is even). Intuitively
speaking, the parity function is not NCC; assuming all agents other than i disclose their
true values, agent i has the incentive to lie; it will then reverse the result of the computation
and obtain the correct value ofw, whereas the others will end up with the wrong answer. In
contrast, consider the majority function. Again, intuitively speaking, this function is non-
cooperatively computable; if an agent attempts to deceive the others he will not in general
be able to reconstruct the correct value himself.
These simple examples make it clear that the NCC framework is inherently game theo-
retic. Essential to the above arguments is the notion of equilibrium; we ask what an agent’s
2 By slight linguistic abuse, we use the abbreviation NCC as both a noun and an adjective.
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best action is, given that the others adopt the equilibrium strategy (in this case, telling the
truth). Indeed, NCC falls squarely in the area of mechanism design (or implementation
theory) [5]. A branch of game theory that has attracted some attention in computer science
recently, mechanism design is concerned with crafting protocols for self-interested agents
that cause these agents behave in a certain desired way. What makes NCC unique from
the standpoint of mechanism design is that the objective of the mechanism designer (the
‘implemented function’, to use the game theoretic jargon), as well as the utility functions
of the individual agents, are deﬁned entirely in terms of the information available to the
different agents.3
It is instructive to contrast the NCC setting with the setting traditionally studied in cryp-
tography, in particular the work on secure multi-party protocols (see [2] for a relatively
recent overview and [4] for a discussion and overview of such protocols in a game-theoretic
context). As in NCC, here too the goal is to compute a function jointly by a set of agents,
each of whom holds part of the input. Furthermore, these agents are self-interested and even
adversarial. The similarities end there, however. In the MPP literature there is an assump-
tion that some of the agents (the ‘good’ agents) follow the prescribed protocol and the rest
(the ‘bad’ agents) deviate from it. There are two models of deviation (the ‘curious’ and the
‘malicious’), but the details do not concern us here. The key is that, with these assumptions,
the traditional cryptographic setting involves no equilibrium analysis and indeed no explicit
representation of the agents’ utility functions; the latter are left implicit. It is an interesting
exercise to attempt a game theoretic model of cryptographic protocols, as was done for the
case of byzantine agreement [7]; such analysis exposes the non-comparable concerns of
cryptography and game theory. In the discussion section at the end we comment on po-
tential connections between NCC and the notion of variable inﬂuence, which is related to
cryptography, but otherwise discussion of cryptography is beyond the scope of this article.
In order to state our speciﬁc results we must make several distinctions. The ﬁrst distinc-
tion, familiar from the auction theory literature as well as from several computer science
contexts, has to do with the information structure of the agents: Are their private inputs
(signals, in the game-theory parlance) independent or correlated? The second distinction,
very familiar in computer science, is between deterministic computation and probabilistic
computation. The third important distinction, which is novel in computer science but stan-
dard in game theory, is whether the system supports the transfer of money and if so whether
the mechanism is required to be budget balanced. (In plain terms, the question is whether
the center can inﬂuence the behavior of the agents by injecting a subsidy into the system.)
3 NCC is in fact a specialization of the more general category which we call informational mechanism design,
or IMD. Recall that in general, any mechanism-design problem takes as input a social-choice function and the
individual preferences of the players. IMD specializes MD by insisting that both the social-choice function and
the individual preferences are purely informational; that is, they are deﬁned in terms of which agent knows what
information. NCC further specializes IMD by having a particular social-choice function; in NCC the desired
outcome is that all agents know the value of the function w. That still leaves a key degree of freedom, namely the
preferences of the players. In this paper, when we speak of NCCwe implicitly assume the two-tiered lexicographic
preference mentioned. But the concept of NCC is broader. For example, in follow-up work [6], the setting is
augmented to capture other potential interests of agents: An agent may prefer that others not know its own input
(so-called privacy) and an agent may prefer to know the inputs of other agents (so-called voyeurism). However,
the basic properties of NCC are revealed already in the case considered here.
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These last two restrictions give rise to three variants of NCC called, respectively, D-NCC
(deterministic NCC), P-NCC (probabilistic NCC, in which the center given freedom to
randomize its computation) and S-NCC (subsidized NCC). In the next section we provide
the formal model of these and in the subsequent section we prove the following results:
1. In the independent values setting:
(a) A Boolean function is D-NCC iff it is not dominated and not reversible.
(b) A Boolean function is P-NCC iff it is D-NCC.
(c) A Boolean function is S-NCC iff it is not reversible.
2. In the correlated values setting:
(a) A Boolean function is D-NCC iff it is not dominated and not reversible.
(b) A Boolean function is P-NCC iff it is not dominated.
(c) Every Boolean function is S-NCC.
In addition, in the discussion section we go beyond Boolean functions and brieﬂy discuss
the NCC of k-order statistics.
2. Deﬁnitions
In this section we formally deﬁne the notion of NCC in the two-tiered preference setting.
We ﬁrst deﬁne the basic, deterministic case and then we deﬁne extensions of it.
2.1. Deterministic NCC (D-NCC)
Given a set of agentsN = {1, 2, . . . , n} and a special agent termed ‘the center’,we assume
that there exists a private secure communication line between every agent i ∈ N and the
center. The type vi of agent i is selected from some domainBi .Although our deﬁnitions can
be generalized to apply more broadly, our technical results primarily address the Boolean
case, in which Bi = B = {0, 1}; from here on we will assume this restriction.
The vector of agent types v = (v1, . . . , vn) is selected from a joint probability distribution
p.We assume full support, i.e.,p(v) > 0 for every v ∈ Bn. The function p induces functions
pi ; for each i ∈ N and vi ∈ B, pi(vi) is the marginal probability that agent i has type vi .
We say that we have an independent values setting if for every v we have that p(v) =
ni=1pi(vi). We say that we have a (strictly) correlated values setting if for every agent i,
there exists b−i ∈ Bn−1 such that p(v−i = b−i |vi = 0) = p(v−i = b−i |vi = 1), where
v−i = (v1, . . . , vi−1, vi+1, . . . , vn). In intuitive terms, in the independent values setting the
type of an agent does not tell it anything about the types of others, while in a correlated
values setting it does.
Given a function w : Bn → B, we consider the following protocol:
1. For any instantiated type vector v ∈ Bn, each agent i declares his type vˆi to the center
(truthfully or not; vˆi = vi may or may not hold).
2. The center computes the value w(vˆ) = w(vˆ1, . . . , vˆn) and announces it to all agents.
3. Each agent i computes w(v) based on w(vˆ) and vi (his true input).
The protocol deﬁnes a strategy space for each agent. A pure strategy for agent i is a pair
of functions (fi, gi). fi : B → B, the declaration function, determines the input declared
to the center based on the true input. Of particular interest will be the truthful declaration
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function, namely the identity function f t (v) = v. gi : B2 → B, the interpretation function,
is used by the agent to decide on the value of the function based on the announcement by the
center and his true input. Of particular interest will be the trusting interpretation function,
namely the projection function gt (v1, v2) = v1 in which the agent simply accepts the value
announced by the center. We will call the strategy (f t , gt ) straightforward.
Note that the strategy proﬁle4 consisting only of straightforward strategies results in
each agent’s computing w correctly for all input vectors. We are interested in functions for
which such a strategy proﬁle forms an equilibrium. In this equilibrium, for each agent the
straightforward strategy is a best response to all other agents’ adopting the straightforward
strategy. Of course, whether a strategy is a best response depends on the agent’s preferences.
The deﬁnition below captures the lexicographic ordering in each agent’s preference, with
correctness preceding exclusivity.
Throughout this paper, as we did for v−i above, for any vector (x1, . . . , xn) we deﬁne
x−i = (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn). We also use (xi, x−i ) to denote the reconstituted vec-
tor (x1, . . . , xn). For simplicity, we will often use z(xi, x−i ) to denote the application of
a function z to the vector (xi, x−i ), rather than the more cumbersome z((xi, x−i )). The
following deﬁnition applies to any domain B, though again we are concentrating on the
Boolean domain B = {0, 1}.
Deﬁnition 1. Let N, p,w be as above. Thenw is deterministically non-cooperatively com-
putable5 , or D-NCC, if the following holds: For any agent i, every strategy (fi, gi) and
every vi ∈ B, it is the case that:
• either there exists v−i ∈ B−i such that gi(w(fi(vi), v−i ), vi) = w(vi, v−i ),
• or else for every v−i ∈ B−i we have w(fi(vi), v−i ) = w(vi, v−i ).
Note that the deﬁnition assumes that agents only care whether all other agents com-
pute correctly or whether at least one of them does not. The deﬁnition takes no stance on
whether the agent distinguishes among outcomes in which different nonempty sets of agents
miscompute or among outcomes in which the agent itself miscomputes.
Two ﬁnal comments about D-NCC. In D-NCC there is no discretion in designing the
center’s part of the protocol and so mechanism design reduces to equilibrium veriﬁcation.
In the more elaborate versions—P-NCC and S-NCC—there will be more discretion in this
regard.Also, note that we have not considered more elaborate interaction among the players
and the center, beyond this simple two-phase communication. Full discussion of this point
lies outside the scope of the article and the reader can take this as an arbitrary restriction.
However, the reader familiar with the revelation principle [5] will recognize that in fact no
generality is lost by restricting the attention to this class of protocols.
2.2. From D-NCC to P-NCC
We will deﬁne two extensions of the basic D-NCC setting. In this section we discuss
a probabilistic extension, termed P-NCC. This is a natural extension from the computer
4 A strategy proﬁle is vector of strategies, one for each agent.
5 Under lexicographic ordering of correctness and exclusivity; we omit this comment in future deﬁnitions.
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science perspective; in the next section we discuss a different extension that is natural from
the game theoretic perspective.
In P-NCC we still look for equilibria in which agents adopt the straightforward strategy,
but we allow the center—with some probability—to announce to the agents an incorrect
value. We now have greater ﬂexibility in deciding the protocol for the center. Rather than
compute w, the center will compute n functions hi , one for each agent (that is, given a
declared type vector vˆ, the center will announce to agent i the value hi(vˆ)). In general we
will have that hi = w. Furthermore, in general hi will be probabilistic; that is, hi : Bn →
(B), where (B) is the set of probability distributions over B.
For j = i, deﬁne
Ej(i, fi, gi) = (vi ,v−i )∈Bn [p(vi, v−i )Prob(w(v) = hj (fi(vi), v−i ))]
as the probability of agent j ending up with the wrong value ofw, assuming all agents other
than i follow the truthful equilibrium protocol, while i’s strategy is (fi, gi). Note that in this
expression, the expectation is taken both over p (the joint probability distribution over the
inputs) and over Prob (which is determined by the probabilistic function hj ).
Of course, in the expression above Ej does not depend on gi . However, we use this
notation so that we can overload it and apply it when i = j as well. This case, which
captures i’s estimation of his own probability of error, is deﬁned by:
Ei(i, fi, gi) = (vi ,v−i )∈B [p(vi, v−i )Prob(w(vi, v−i ) = gi(hi(fi(vi), v−i ), vi))].
In the followingdeﬁnition, letf t andgt again denote the identity andprojection functions,
respectively.
Deﬁnition 2. Let N, p, w and Ej be as above. Let 0 < 1. Then w is probabilistically
non-cooperatively computable with accuracy , or -P-NCC, if there exist hi such that the
following both hold:
• For every i ∈ N and v ∈ Bn, Prob[w(v) = hi(v)] < .
• For any agent i and any strategy (fi, gi),
◦ either Ei(i, fi, gi) > Ei(i, f t , gt ),
◦ or else the following are both true:
◦ Ei(i, fi, gi) = Ei(i, f t , gt ) and
◦ Ej(i, fi, gi)Ej(i, f t , gt ) for some agent j = i.
In other words, again the straightforward strategy is a best response to the other agents’
adopting the straightforward strategy; deviating either increases one’s own probability of
error, or leaves it unchanged while not increasing the error probability of others. In addition,
we require a  upper bound on the probability of error.
The non-relativized notion of P-NCC is then deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 3. Let N, p, w be as above. Then w is probabilistically non-cooperatively com-
putable, or P-NCC, if w is -P-NCC for any 0 < 1 .
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2.3. From D-NCC to S-NCC
So far we have assumed that the agents only derive utility from computing the function
or denying others that beneﬁt.We now add another ingredient to the mix, namely money.As
in D-NCC we require that the center compute the function correctly; here again there is no
discretion in this regard.However, in additionwe give the center the power to allocatemoney
to the agents by way of injecting additional incentives into the system. If the probabilistic
extension in the previous subsection is natural in computer science, this extension is natural
in economics and game theory. This subsidized variant of NCC is termed S-NCC.
Speciﬁcally, in S-NCC, as in D-NCC, the center is restricted to computing w(vˆ) and
announcing the result to the agents. But in addition, the center has n (commonly known)
payment functions mi :Bn → ; mi(vˆ) is the payment from the center to agent i as a
function of the declared values by all agents. In general, the paymentmi(vˆ) can be positive
or negative and be of arbitrary magnitude. However, we will be interested in mechanisms
in which in expectation the payment is positive and small.
Agent i has an error cost, which we normalize to be 0 if the computation is correct and
1 otherwise. The overall utility function of an agent who receives payment m and suffers
error cost d is simply m − d . This so-called quasi-linear utility function [5] might raise
two potential questions. First, one might wonder why it is reasonable to normalize different
agents’ utilities on the same scale. The answer is that in our game theoretic analysis, inter-
agent comparison of utilities is not meaningful and does not impact equilibrium analysis.
Second, one might ask why it is meaningful to correlate the scales of the error cost with the
scale of money. The answer is that in some circumstances this could indeed be an important
issue, but in the equilibria we will identify the amount of money is arbitrarily small and
dominated by the error.6
Note that in S-NCC the strategy space of agents is larger than in D-NCC (or P-NCC).
Speciﬁcally, any interpretation function gi is now gi :B ×  × B → B; the additional
second argument is the payment received by the center.We extend the notion of the trusting
interpretation function to the S-NCC setting in a natural way; continuing to use gt to denote
the trusting interpretation function, we deﬁne gt (r, x, v) = r . The space of declaration
functions remains unchanged in S-NCC and we continue to denote the truthful declaration
function by f t . Finally, we continue to use the term straightforward strategy for (f t , gt )
as in the D-NCC and P-NCC settings.
For convenience, we will slightly overload the mi function.
Given an input vector v and i’s declaration strategy fi , let
mj(i, v, fi) = mj(fi(vi), v−i )
6 An alternative deﬁnition, which would obviate these questions, would be to keep the monetary payoff separate
and extend the two-tiered lexicographic preference structure to a three-tiered one, with correctness and monetary
payoff both preceding exclusivity (the ordering between monetary payoff and correctness would be unimportant
for our purposes). All our results would still hold under this model. However, it is convenient to amalgamate the
ﬁrst two into a direct overall utility function and the quasi-linear model is both natural and commonly used.
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be the payment to agent j, assuming all other agents, excluding i, declare truthfully. Then,
for any vi ∈ B, deﬁne
Emj(i, vi, fi) = x∈Bn [p(x | xi = vi)mj (i, x, fi)]
as the expected payment to agent j under the same conditions, conditional on agent i’s input
being vi .
Next we deﬁne dj (i, v, fi, gi) to be the error cost to agent j when the input vector is v
and when all agents but i play the straightforward strategy (f t , gt ) while i plays the pure
strategy (fi, gi):
for j = i: dj (i, v, fi, gi)= 0 if w(v) = w(fi(vi), v−i ),
= 1 otherwise,
for j = i: dj (i, v, fi, gi)= 0 if w(v) = gi(w(fi(vi), v−i ), mi(i, v, fi), vi),
= 1 otherwise.
For any i, j , the direct utility for j given the input vector and i’s strategy is given by
uj (i, v, fi, gi) = mj(i, v, fi)− dj (i, v, fi, gi)
and the expected version, conditional on i’s value by
Euj (i, vi, fi, gi) = Emj(i, vi, fi)− Edj (i, v, fi, gi).
With these deﬁnitions we deﬁne S-NCC as follows.
Deﬁnition 4. Let N, p and w be as above. Let  > 0. Then w is non-cooperatively com-
putable with subsidy , or -S-NCC, if there exist payment functionsmi as above for which
the following holds for any agent i, any strategy (fi, gi) of i and every vi ∈ B:
• either Eui(i, vi, fi, gi) < Eui(i, vi, f t , gt ) or else the following are both true:
◦ Eui(i, vi, fi, gi) = Eui(i, vi, f t , gt ) and
◦ Edj (i, vi, fi, gi)Edj (i, vi, f t , gt ) for some agent j = i.
• 0Emj(i, v, f t ) for every i, j ∈ N and every v ∈ Bn.
As in previous deﬁnitions, this one requires that it is an equilibrium for all agents to adopt
the straightforward strategy. Note that this deﬁnition assumes that an agent cares about his
error cost and his monetary payoff, as well as the error cost of the other agents, but not
about the payments to the other agents.
Finally, analogously to the case of P-NCC, we deﬁne the non-relativized version of
S-NCC:
Deﬁnition 5. Let N, p and w be as above. A function w is subsidized non-cooperatively
computable, or S-NCC, if w is -S-NCC for every  > 0.
3. Results for Boolean functions
Our goal in this section is to precisely characterize the Boolean NCC functions. We will
provide six characterizations—of functions that are D-NCC, P-NCC and S-NCC, each for
both the independent values case and the correlated values one.
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We will need the following notions.
• A function w : Bn → B is called (conditionally) dominated if there exist an agent i and
a vi ∈ B such that
1. for all y−i , z−i ∈ Bn−1, it is the case that w(vi, y−i ) = w(vi, z−i ); and
2. vi is relevant, in that there exists y−i ∈ Bn−1 such thatw(vi, y−i ) = w(1−vi, y−i ).
• A functionw is reversible if there exist i ∈ N and vi ∈ B such that for every y−i ∈ Bn−1
it is the case that w(vi, y−i ) = 1− w(1− vi, y−i ).7
Note: These deﬁnitions are reminiscent of, but different from, deﬁnitions in the
social choice literature (e.g., [8]). We comment on this further in the discussion
section.
3.1. Independent values
Our basic result concerns D-NCC:
Theorem 1. In an independent values setting, a Boolean function is D-NCC iff it is not
reversible and not dominated.
Proof. Assume that the function w is reversible. Then there exists an agent i such that
w(0, y−i ) = 1 − w(1, y−i ), for all y−i ∈ Bn−1. Suppose all agents but i employ the
straightforward strategy (f t , gt ). Then (f t , gt ) is not a best response for i.A better response
is (fi, gi)where fi(vi) = 1−vi and gi(y, vi) = 1−y, for all vi, y ∈ B (this better response
ensures that other agents always miscompute w but i never does). This proves that if w is
reversible then it is not D-NCC.
Next assume that the functionw is dominated.Then, there exist an agent i and vi ∈ B such
that w(vi, y−i ) = w(vi, z−i ) = d for every y−i , z−i ∈ Bn−1 and there exists x−i ∈ Bn−1
such thatw(vi, x−i ) = w(1− vi, x−i ). Suppose all agents but i employ the straightforward
strategy (f t , gt ). Then again (f t , gt ) is not a best response for i.A better response is (fi, gi)
which differs from (f t , gt ) only in that fi(vi) = 1 − vi and gi(y, vi) = d for all y ∈ B
(this better response ensures that other agents miscompute w(vi, xi) but i does not). This
proves that if w is dominated then it is not D-NCC.
Finally, assume that the function w is neither reversible nor dominated. Consider agent
i with strategy (fi, gi) and suppose all agents but i employ the straightforward strategy
(f t , gt ). Clearly, if i is irrelevant to w—that is, if w(0, y−i ) = w(1, y−i ) for all y−i ∈
Bn−1—then (fi, gi) = (f t , gt ) is a best response for i. So assume that i is relevant and
assume further that fi = f t . Suppose agent i has the true input vi and declares value
fi(vi) = 1 − vi and the center announces the value r. What could the value of gi(r, vi)
be? Since w is not dominated and since i is relevant, it cannot be that gi(r, vi) = r without
causing i to miscalculate for some inputs of the others. But at the same time it cannot be
that gi(r, vi) = 1− r , since this would imply that w is reversible. From this contradiction
7 Note that for Boolean functions it is the case that if this property holds for vi then it also holds for 1 − vi .
Also note that among the symmetric functions, only the parity function (whose value is 1 iff an even number of its
arguments are 1) and its negation are reversible, but there are many other non-symmetric reversible functions.
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it follows that necessarily fi = f t . But clearly if fi = f t then (fi, gi) = (f t , gt ) is a best
response for i (if all agents including i declare truthfully, i only loses by deviating from the
trusting interpretation function). The proves that if w is neither reversible nor dominated
then it is D-NCC. 
P-NCC was introduced with the hope of increasing the power of NCC. The next result is
disappointing in this respect, at least for the independent values context (but see the results
for correlated values below):
Theorem 2. In an independent values setting, a Boolean function is P-NCC if and only if
it is D-NCC.
Proof. Consider a Boolean function w. Trivially, if w is D-NCC then it is also P-NCC.
Since a function is D-NCC iff it is neither dominated nor reversible, it is sufﬁcient to show
that if w is either dominated or reversible then it is not P-NCC.
Assume that w is dominated. Then, there exist i ∈ N , d, vi ∈ B, such that for all
y−i , z−i ∈ Bn−1 and some x−i ∈ Bn−1 it is the case that w(vi, y−i ) = w(vi, z−i ) = d,
whilew(1−vi, x−i ) = 1−d .Assume thatw is P-NCC. Let 0 <  < 1; thenw is -P-NCC.
This means that there exist functions hi (i = 1..n) for the center such that for each instance
v ∈ Bn, Prob[hi(v) = w(v)] < . Assume that all agents j = i play the straightforward
strategy (f t , gt ); it is enough to show that the straightforward strategy is not a best response
for i. Consider the following strategy (fi, gi): fi(vi) = fi(1 − vi) = 1 − vi and for both
r ∈ B, gi(r, vi) = d while gi(r, 1 − vi) = r . We will show that (fi, gi) is a better
response than (f t , gt ). Clearly Ei(i, fi, gi)Ei(i, f t , gt ). If Ei(i, fi, gi) < Ei(i, f t , gt )
then we are done; (fi, gi) is a better response for i than (f t , gt ). So supposeEi(i, fi, gi) =
Ei(i, f
t , gt ). To show that (f t , gt ) is not a best response in this case either, we need to
show that Ej(i, fi, gi) > Ej (i, f t , gt ) for some j = i. But now consider x−i above, for
which w(1− vi, x−i ) = 1− d . Pick any agent j = i. Let Prob[hj (1− vi, x−i ) = d] = q.
For the straightforward strategy proﬁle to be an equilibrium, it would have to be that q < 
(or else agent j would err with probability greater than  on w(1 − vi, x−i ), contradicting
the deﬁnition of -P-NCC). Now consider Ej(i, fi, gi) and deﬁne r = p(vi, x−i ), the
probability of the speciﬁc input vector (vi, x−i ). It must be the case thatEj(i, fi, gi)r(1−
q), since (a)Ej(i, fi, gi)must be at least r times the probability that the centerwill announce
to j the wrong value for this speciﬁc input (recall that according to fi , for this input i
announces 1 − vi) and (b) since the center announces d with probability q, it announces
1− d with probability 1− q. And thus Since q < , we have that Ej(i, fi, gi)r(1− ).
However, for  < r1+r we have that r(1 − ) >  and so for small enough  we have that
Ej(i, fi, gi) >  > Ej(i, f t , gt ). This concludes the proof that ifw is dominated then it is
not P-NCC.
Now assume thatw is reversible. Then, there exist i ∈ N, vi ∈ B, such thatw(vi, z−i ) =
1 − w(1 − vi, z−i ) for every z−i ∈ Bn−1. Assume that w is P-NCC. Let 0 <  < 1; then
w is -P-NCC. Again, this means that there exist functions hi for the center such that for
each instance v ∈ Bn, Prob(hi(v) = w(v)) < . Assume that all agents j = i play the
straightforward strategy (f t , gt ); it is enough to show that the straightforward strategy is
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not a best response for i. Let 1 = z−i∈Bn−1p(z−i )Prob(w(vi, z−i ) = hi(vi, z−i )) and
2 = z−i∈Bn−1 [p(z−i )(Prob(w(1− vi, z−i ) = hi(1− vi, z−i )))].8
If 1 > 2, consider a deviation by i from the straightforward strategy to (fi, gi) where
fi(vi) = fi(1− vi) = 1− vi and for both r ∈ B, gi(r, vi) = 1− r while gi(r, 1− vi) = r .
We get that Ei(i, fi, gi) < Ei(i, f t , gt ) and therefore the straightforward strategy is not a
best-response.
If 2 > 1, consider a deviation by i from the straightforward strategy to (fi, gi) where
fi(vi) = fi(1− vi) = vi and for both r ∈ B, gi(r, vi) = r while gi(r, 1− vi) = 1− r . We
get that Ei(i, fi, gi) < Ei(i, f t , gt ) and therefore again the straightforward strategy in not
a best-response.
Finally, if 1 = 2, consider a deviation by agent i as in the case in which 1 > 2
above, i.e., a deviation to (fi, gi) where fi(vi) = fi(1 − vi) = 1 − vi and gi(r, vi) =
1− r, gi(r, 1− vi) = r , for any r ∈ B. We get that Ei(i, fi, gi) = Ei(i, f t , gt ). The proof
now proceeds as in the proof for the dominated case (the following is an abridged version of
that proof; the full proof can be substituted in here verbatim). To show that (f t , gt ) is not a
best response in this case either, we need to show thatEj(i, fi, gi) > Ej (i, f t , gt ) for some
j = i. Consider x−i ∈ Bn−1 that satisﬁes d = w(vi, x−i ) and 1− d = w(1− vi, x−i ). Let
Prob[hj (1−vi, x−i ) = d] = q. For the straightforward strategy proﬁle to be an equilibrium,
it would have to be that q <  (or else agent j would err with probability greater than  on
w(1 − vi, x−i ), contradicting the deﬁnition of -P-NCC). Now consider Ej(i, fi, gi) and
again deﬁne r = p(vi, x−i ). As before, it must be the case thatEj(i, fi, gi)r(1−q). But
since q < , we have that Ej(i, fi, gi)r(1− ) and thus for small enough  we have that
Ej(i, fi, gi) >  > Ej(i, f t , gt ). This concludes the proof that if w is reversible then it is
not P-NCC. 
Finally, we consider the power of subsidies:
Theorem 3. In an independent values setting, a function is S-NCC if and only if it is not
reversible.
Proof. From Theorem 1 we know that a function is D-NCC iff it is not dominated and
not reversible. Since any function that is D-NCC is also S-NCC, it is enough to show that
(a) dominated, non-reversible functions are always S-NCC and (b) reversible functions are
never S-NCC.
The constant functions are non-dominated and non-reversible and therefore S-NCC (and
even D-NCC), which is consistent with our theorem and therefore in the remainder of the
proof we will consider only non-constant functions.
Let w be any non-constant Boolean function. We will ﬁrst show that if w is dominated
and non-reversible then it is S-NCC. That is, we show that for any given  > 0, there
exists payment functions mj (j = 1..n) such that for every agent i, if all agents j = i
play the straightforward strategy (f t , gt ), then (f t , gt ) is the best response for i; and that
furthermore under these payment functions the expected payment to any agent is bounded
by . We will prove this by construction. If agent i is irrelevant or there is no vi ∈ B such
8 Note that in the independent values setting, p(z−i ) = p(z−i | vi ).
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that w(vi, z−i ) = w(vi, y−i ) for all y−i , z−i ∈ Bn−1 9 then we take the payment to i to be
identically 0. Since w is also non-reversible the best response for agent i is to use (f t , gt );
this is exactly the proof as for the D-NCC case. Now consider an agent i with type vi ∈ B,
such that w(vi, z−i ) = d for every z−i ∈ Bn−1. Given that w is not a constant function
and is not reversible then it must be the case that there exist y−i , z−i ∈ Bn−1 such that
d = w(1 − vi, y−i ) = (1 − vi, z−i ) = 1 − d. We determine the payment for agent i by
mi(vi, z−i ) =  andmi(1−vi, z−i ) = 0, for every z−i ∈ Bn−1, where 0 <  <  as will be
determined below. Suppose that agent i deviates to (fi, gi) and that his type is 1−vi . Then,
there exist y−i , x−i ∈ Bn−1 such that w(1− vi, y−i ) = d and w(1− vi, x−i ) = 1− d. If
fi(1−vi) = 1−vi , then ifgi(r, 0, 1−vi) = 1−r for some r ∈ B thenEui(i, 1−vi, fi, gi) <
0 = Eui(i, 1 − vi, f t , gt ) since such deviation will only cause miscomputation by i with
non-zero probability. If fi(1 − vi) = vi then the output received from the center will be
d and the payment to the agent is . Let r1 = p(1 − vi, y−i ) and let r2 = p(1 − vi, x−i ).
If gi(d, , 1 − vi) = d then agent i’s computed output is wrong with probability of at
least r2 and if gi(d, , 1 − vi) = 1 − d then its output is wrong with probability of at
least r1. By taking  < min(r1, r2) we get that Eui(i, 1 − vi, fi, gi) − min(r1, r2) <
0 = Eui(i, 1 − vi, f t , gt ) whenever fi(1 − vi) = vi and for every gi . Together we get
Eui(i, 1 − vi, fi, gi) < Eui(i, 1 − v, f t , gt ) for every (fi, gi) = (f t , gt ). Now assume
that agent i’s type is vi . If fi(vi) = 1−vi thenEui(i, vi, fi, gi) <  = Eui(i, vi, f t , gt ). If
fi(vi) = vi andgi(d, , vi) = 1−d thenEui(i, vi, fi, gi)−1 <  = Eui(i, vi, f t , gt ).
Together we get Eui(i, vi, fi, gi) < Eui(i, vi, f t , gt ) for every (fi, gi) = (f t , gt ).
Given the above and since  <  we get that w is -S-NCC. Since this is true for any
 > 0, this proves that if any dominated, non-reversible function is S-NCC.
We now show that any reversible function is not S-NCC. Assume that w is reversible. In
this case, there exist an agent i and type vi of agent i, such that w(vi, y−i ) = 1 − w(1 −
vi, y−i ) for every y−i ∈ Bn−1. Assume that all agents, potentially excluding i, use the
straightforward strategy (f t , gt ). Let 0 = Eui(i, 0, f t , gt ) and let 1 = Eui(i, 1, f t , gt ).
If0 > 1 thendeviating to (fi, gi),wherefi(0) = fi(1) = 0, gi(0, t, 0) = 0, gi(1, t, 0) =
1, gi(0, t, 1) = 1, gi(1, t, 1) = 0 (for every t) satisﬁesEui(i, 1, fi, gi) > Eui(i, 1, f t , gt ).
Similarly, if 0 < 1 then deviating to (fi, gi), where fi(0) = fi(1) = 1, gi(0, t, 0) =
1, gi(1, t, 0) = 0, gi(0, t, 1) = 0, gi(1, t, 1) = 1 (for every t) satisﬁes Eui(i, 0, fi, gi) >
Eui(i, 0, f t , gt ).Thus it is enough to consider the case inwhich0 = 1. Let us consider de-
viation to (fi, gi), where fi(0) = fi(1) = 0, gi(0, t, 0) = 0, gi(1, t, 0) = 1, gi(0, t, 1) =
1, gi(1, t, 1) = 0 (for every t). In this case Eui(i, vi, f t , gt ) = Eui(i, vi, fi, gi) for every
vi ∈ B. However, agent j = i will then compute a wrong answer whenever agent i’s
type is 1, which happens with some positive probability. Hence, Edj (i, 1, fi, gi) > 0 =
Edj (i, 1, f t , gt ) and w is not S-NCC. 
3.2. Correlated values
Intuitively speaking, in a correlated values setting we would expect more functions to be
NCC than in the independent values case, since more information is conveyed by the private
9 Note that this case is not precluded by the fact that w is dominated; it simply cannot be that all agents have
these properties.
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information. Imagine that the values to agents are assigned as follows:With probability p2 all
agents are assigned 1, with probability p2 all agents are assigned 0 andwith probability 1−p
each agent’s type is independently and uniformly selected from B. Imagine furthermore that
p is large, for example 98%. Now if a given agent has the private value 1 he knows that
with high probability the other agents do as well and thus can predict with high degree of
accuracy the value of the function.
It is straightforward to see, given that in the correlated values setting there is still non-zero
probability of every vector of types, that the set of D-NCC functions remains unchanged in
the correlated values case:
Theorem 4. In a correlated value setting, a Boolean function is D-NCC iff it is not domi-
nated and not reversible.
The proof is identical to the proof in the independent values case and is omitted.
In the remaining cases, however, correlated values do yield greater computing power. For
reasons that will become clear, we skip P-NCC for the moment and speak about S-NCC.
We have the following theorem:
Theorem 5. In a correlated values setting, any Boolean function is S-NCC.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary  > 0.We will show that any Boolean function is -S-NCC in
the correlated values case. By the deﬁnition of correlated values, we have that Prob[v−i =
y−i |vi = 0] = Prob[v−i = y−i |vi = 1] for some y−i ∈ Bn−1. Let pi,l = min(Prob[v−i =
y−i |vi = 1],Prob[v−i = y−i |vi = 0]), pi,h = max(Prob[v−i = y−i |vi = 1],Prob[v−i =
y−i |vi = 0]). Let vi,h and vi,l be the types of agent i corresponding to pi,h and pi,l ,
respectively.
The proof is again by construction and we set the payment functions as follows.An agent
who announces vi,l gets nothing:mi(vi,l, z−i ) = 0 for every z−i ∈ Bn−1. However, an agent
who announces vih gets a lottery, whose value is positive only under truthful declaration:
mi(vi,h, y−i ) = i + 1 (recall that y−i is ﬁxed here) and mi(vi,h, z−i ) = i − pi,h1−pi,h for
every z−i = y−i , where 0 < i <  and i < (1 − pi,l)
(
pi,h
1−pi,h
)
− pi,l . Observe that
(1− pi,l)
(
pi,h
1−pi,h
)
− pi,l > 0.
If all agents use the straightforward strategy (f t , gt ) then the payment to agent i with
type vi,l is 0 and the expected payment to agent i with type vi,h is pi,h(i + 1) + (1 −
pi,h)
(
i − pi,h1−pi,h
)
= i < , as required. Consider a deviation by agent i from (f t , gt )
to (fi, gi). Since Eui(i, v, f t , gi)Eui(i, v, f t , gt ) and Edj (i, v, f t , gi) = Edj (i, v,
f t , gt ) for every v ∈ B and j = i (such deviation will not change the payment to i
and the fact the others will compute correctly, but might only make i compute incor-
rectly), it is enough to consider deviations where fi = f t . If agent i submits vi,l while
his type is vi,h then he will be paid nothing instead of getting an expected payment of i
(and computing with no error) if he were to use the straightforward strategy. Therefore,
Eui(i, vi,h, fi, gi) < Eui(i, vi,h, f
t , gt ). Conversely, if agent i submits vi,h when his type
his vi,l then his expected payment is i + pi,l − (1 − pi,l) pi,h1−pi,h . The latter however is
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negative, since pi,l − (1 − pi,l) pi,h1−pi,h < pi,l − pi,h < 0 and since we have selected i <
(1 − pi,l)
(
pi,h
1−pi,h
)
− pi,l . This implies (since with (f t , gt ) we get accurate computation
and the above payments) that Eui(i, vi,l , fi, gi) < Eui(i, vi,l , f t , gt ).
From this it follows that w is -S-NCC. Furthermore, this is true for any  > 0 and
therefore w is S-NCC. 
We now turn to the remaining case, that of P-NCC. The positive result for S-NCC in-
spires us to look for a similar mechanism for the center, where the power of randomization
compensates for the lack of monetary incentives. It turns out that the ability to randomize
is not quite as powerful as the ability to print money, but it is not without power:
Theorem 6. In a correlated values setting, a Boolean function is P-NCC if and only if it is
not dominated.
Proof. The proof that dominated functions are not P-NCC as in the independent values
case; the correlation among the values plays no role in this direction.
For the other direction, assume that a function is not dominated. Let  > 0.We will show
that w is -P-NCC. It is sufﬁcient to show that w is -P-NCC for sufﬁciently small , in
particular for  < 0.5. We will make use of the following deﬁnitions:
Given a Boolean function w we distinguish between three types of agents:
1. Agent i is a reverser if for v ∈ B we have that w(vi, z−i ) = 1 − w(1 − vi, z−i ) for
every z−i ∈ Bn−1.
2. Agent i is irrelevant if for every v ∈ B, z−i ∈ Bn−1 we have that w(v, z−i ) =
w(1− v, z−i )
3. Agent i is simple if it is not a reverser and not irrelevant.
By the deﬁnition of correlated values, we have that Prob[v−i = y−i |vi = 0] = Prob[v−i =
y−i |vi = 1] for some y−i ∈ Bn−1. Let pi,l = min(Prob[v−i = y−i |vi = 1],Prob[v−i =
y−i |vi = 0]), pi,h = max(Prob[v−i = y−i |vi = 1],Prob[v−i = y−i |vi = 0]). Let vi,h and
vi,l be the types of agent i corresponding to pi,h and pi,l , respectively.
Let qi be a random variable that gets the value i if y−i is declared by the agents in
N−i and − pi,h1−pi,h i otherwise, where i > 0 satisﬁes that max
(
i ,
pi,h
1−pi,h i
)
< 3 . The
expected value of qi is 0 if agent i has the type vi,h and is i
(
pi,l − (1− pi,l) pi,h1−pi,h
)
<
i (pi,l −pi,h) < 0 if i has type vi,l . Pick i > 0 such that 0<i<min
(
i (pi,h − pi,l), 3
)
.
We now construct the functions hi as follows. For any declaration vector vˆ, the center
announces to agent i the valuew(vˆ)with probability si and 1−w(vˆ)with probability 1−si ,
where si is determined as follows:
• If i is simple, si = 1.
• Otherwise (i is not simple), let the declared types be vˆ = (vˆ1, . . . , vˆn). If vˆi = vi,h then
si = 1− 23+ i + qi where the value of qi is determined based on whether the other
agents declared y−i or not. Otherwise (if vˆi = vi,l), si = 1 − 23. Observe that our
selection of parameters satisfy that 0.5 < 1−  < si < 1.
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Now consider agent i, with type vi ∈ B and the potential deviations of it to (fi, gi) =
(f t , gt ).
• When the agent is simple then since w is also not dominated, we get that Ei(i, fi, gi) >
Ei(i, f
t , gt ) for every (fi, gi) = (f t , gt ); the proof is identical to the proof that non-
dominated non-reversible functions are D-NCC (and the inequality is strict since we are
considering only relevant agents).
• In order to deal with non-simple agents, we introduce the following construct. For
i ∈ N, vi ∈ B let ti (vi, d) = z−i∈Bn−1p(vi, z−i )Prob(w(d, z−i ) = hi(d, z−i )), i.e.
ti (vi, d) is the probability the center will announce to i the right answer for the input it
receives when i declares d and his type is vi . Note the subtle deﬁnition: ti refers only
to correctness relative to the declared values. However, both d and vi are relevant to
assessing this correctness: d determines i’s declaration and vi induces a probability over
the remaining declarations, given the joint distribution p over the inputs and the fact that
the remaining agents play the straightforward function.
We nowﬁrst show that for any non-simple agent i and vi ∈ B we have that ti (vi, 1−vi) <
ti(vi, vi). Assume that a non-simple agent i, who has the type vi,l , declares vi,h instead.
Then the center will announce to him the right answer with probability 1 − 23 + i +
i
(
pi,l − (1− pi,l) pi,h1−pi,h
)
< 1 − 23 + i − i (pi,h − pi,l) < 1 − 23 = ti (vi,l , vi,l).
Assume that i has type vi,h but declares vi,l . In this case the center will announce to i
the right answer with probability 1− 23, but has he declared vi,h the center would have
announced the right answer with probability 1 − 23 + i + pi,h − (1 − pi,h) pi,h1−pi,h =
1 − 23 + i > 1 − 23. Hence, we get that for any non-simple agent i and vi ∈ B we
have that ti (vi, 1− vi) < ti(vi, vi).
Assume i is a non-simple agent who uses the strategy (fi, gi) instead of the straightfor-
ward strategy (f t , gt ), while all other agents use the straightforward strategy:
◦ If i is irrelevant and since ti (vi, d) > 0.5 for every vi, d ∈ B, then for every fi we
have thatEi(i, fi, gt ) < Ei(i, fi, gi)where gi = gt . Since ti (vi, 1−vi) < ti(vi, vi)
for every vi ∈ B we get that Ei(i, f t , gt ) < Ei(i, fi, gt ) < Ei(i, fi, gi) for every
fi = f t and gi = gt . Hence we get that Ei(i, f t , gt ) < Ei(i, fi, gi) for every
(fi, gi) = (f t , gt ) when agent i is irrelevant.
◦ If i is a reverser, then if it declares 1−vi when his type is vi and is announced r by the
center, then since w(vi, z−i ) = 1−w(1− vi, z−i ) for every z−i ∈ Bn−1 we should
have gi(r, 1 − vi) = 1 − r in order that deviation to (fi, gi) would be potentially
proﬁtable (otherwise agent iwill compute the right answer with probability less than
0.5). This implies that the probability of computing the right answer by i when he
uses (fi, gi) where fi(v) = 1− vi and his type is vi is at most ti (vi, 1− vi), while
when following (f t , gt ) he will compute the correct answer when his type is vi with
probability ti (vi, vi) > ti(vi, 1−vi). Hence we get thatEi(i, f t , gt ) < Ei(i, fi, gi)
for every (fi, gi) = (f t , gt ) when agent i is a reverser.
Since the probability of providing the right answer is always greater than 1 −  and for
every agent i we have that Ei(i, f t , gt ) < Ei(i, fi, gi) for every (fi, gi) = (f t , gt ), we
have that w is -P-NCC. Since the above construction is deﬁned for any sufﬁciently small
error probability  > 0, we get that w is P-NCC. 
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4. Discussion
In this paper we introduced the concept of non-cooperative computing NCC and deﬁned
three ﬂavors of it—deterministic (D-NCC), probabilistic (P-NCC) and subsidized (S-NCC).
The NCC framework is very broad and one of our goals has been to simply put it on the
research map. In addition, we provided a comprehensive analysis of the class of Boolean
functions that are NCC when the utility function of agents is deﬁned by correctness and
exclusivity, ordered lexicographically. For this case our results are summarized in the fol-
lowing table (each cell in the table speciﬁes the necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for the
function to be NCC in the corresponding setting):
D-NCC P-NCC S-NCC
independent not reversible and not reversible and not
values not dominated not dominated reversible
correlated not reversible and not any
values not dominated dominated
We have restricted our results to Boolean functions. This was done in order to make
our discussion more concrete, while concentrating on a class of functions that is central
in computer science. Nevertheless, our deﬁnitions can be easily extended to more general
domains and further results shown. For example, with appropriate extension of the deﬁni-
tions, it can be shown that in the independent values setting, the k-order statistic is D-NCC
for 1 < k < n, while the max and min functions are not D-NCC; however, the max and
min functions are S-NCC. However, pursuing these extensions is beyond the scope of this
article.
As we discussed in the introduction, the NCC framework is quite distinct from other
frameworks and in particular from those encountered traditionally in cryptography. Let
us nonetheless conclude with an open question regarding an interesting potential three-
way connection between NCC, social-choice theory [8] and a speciﬁc notion related to
cryptography, namely variable inﬂuence [3,4]. We will not repeat the deﬁnitions or results
from these areas and so these commentswill bemeaningful particularly to the reader familiar
with one or both of these ﬁelds. Indeed, such a reader will undoubtedly have noticed the
surface similarity, as well as the deep differences. In particular, both social choice and
variable inﬂuence appeal to the notion of dictatorship, which is stronger than our notion of
(conditional) dominance. Conversely, the most elegant proofs of the seminal result in social
choice theory—Arrow’s impossibility theorem [1,9]—use the notion of a ‘pivotal agent’,
which in some sense is a weaker notion than our notion of a reverser agent and the related
notion of function reversibility. And so at this stage we can point to no crisp technical
connections between NCC and either social choice theory or variable inﬂuence. By the
same token, there are to date no established connections between social choice theory and
variable inﬂuence, despite the fact that such connections were one of the motivations for
studying variable inﬂuence.10 These three pairwise connections seem to us to merit further
investigation.
10 N. Linial, personal communication.
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